Post-Colonial Africa has yet too many flash points, arising from failed and weak states due to poor governance, boundary disputes, lean resources, lack of capacity, ethnic rivalries, power sharing, religious and ideological contentions. The conflict in Sudan presents an interesting scenario. At the surface, it is seemingly a religious war or political conflict. The Darfur region represents the country‟s sore thumb. But with oil found in the region and the Chinese prospecting there, it is abundantly clear that what originally was a religious divide (Islamists versus animists) or racial (Arab stock in the North) versus Negroid stock (in the South) is now an economic conflict. It is in this light that the conflict should be seen and the resolution efforts should be thus directed. The African Union which though at its inception is meant for economic capacity building has mediated successfully in troubled spots like in the Algeria –Morocco and Rwanda – Burundi conflicts seem to have reached a deed end in the Darfur region debacle. Is it then that the American inspired AFRICOM is Africa‟s solution to conflict management? Can Africa not go it alone without the UN? Should we go back to the African High Command idea of the Pan-Africanist, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah? Which conflict capacity and organizational structure should the African Union command evolve. If it is to be effective either in Sudan or in any other intractable troubled spot? This paper suggests that the African Union in conjunction with the Chinese Government, who now do mineral business with the Sudanese Government should put pressure on Sudan to accept a United Nations Hybrid force so as to have a well equipped force to secure peace in the Darfur region. Also, the African Union should group factions as well as the Khartoum Government in line with the earlier Abuja peace accords. The data have been generated largely via secondary sources (newspapers, journals, notable authority and the internet), and concludes that the African Union as it stands now does not have the military capacity to manage crisis.
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